Third-Party Service Providers under RPAA: Vendor Oversight, Operational Rist, and Incident Response
Modern payment stacks rely heavily on third-party providers for core components, including cloud infrastructure, fraud detection tools, ledgering, settlement, and customer support. Under Canadaโs ๐๐๐ญ๐๐ข๐ฅ ๐๐๐ฒ๐ฆ๐๐ง๐ญ ๐๐๐ญ๐ข๐ฏ๐ข๐ญ๐ข๐๐ฌ ๐๐๐ญ (๐๐๐๐) and the ๐๐๐ญ๐๐ข๐ฅ ๐๐๐ฒ๐ฆ๐๐ง๐ญ ๐๐๐ญ๐ข๐ฏ๐ข๐ญ๐ข๐๐ฌ ๐๐๐ ๐ฎ๐ฅ๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง๐ฌ (๐๐๐๐), outsourcing does not shift accountability away from the Payment Service Provider (PSP). PSPs are expected to demonstrate effective vendor oversight, operational risk controls, and incident response capability, even when key activities are delivered by third parties.

๐๐ก๐ฒ ๐๐๐๐ฌ ๐๐๐๐ซ๐๐ก ๐๐จ๐ซ ๐๐ก๐ข๐ซ๐-๐๐๐ซ๐ญ๐ฒ ๐๐ฎ๐ฉ๐ฉ๐จ๐ซ๐ญ ๐ข๐ง ๐๐๐๐ ๐๐จ๐ฆ๐ฉ๐ฅ๐ข๐๐ง๐๐
Most PSPs cannot operate without vendors. Identity providers, cloud platforms, fraud tooling, ledger systems, processors, and customer support platforms often sit inside the systems and data pathways that determine whether retail payment activities run reliably.
This is why the practical compliance question is rarely “can we outsource?” The question is whether the PSP can demonstrate that outsourced dependencies are governed, assessed, monitored, and integrated into incident response in a way that holds up during supervisory review.
AMLI Analysis: The common failure mode is lack of evidence. The PSP cannot show how vendor-controlled reality matches policy claims, contract terms, and operational practice.
๐๐ก๐จ ๐ญ๐ก๐ ๐๐๐๐ ๐๐ฉ๐ฉ๐ฅ๐ข๐๐ฌ ๐๐จ
Scope confusion is common, especially for early-stage fintechs with vendor-heavy stacks.
At a high level:
- A PSP with a place of business in Canada is subject to the RPAA for retail payment activities.
- The RPAA can also apply to certain PSPs outside Canada when they perform retail payment activities for an end user in Canada and direct those activities at individuals or entities in Canada.
AMLI Analysis: Selecting and integrating vendors before confirming scope often leads to avoidable retrofit work. Once RPAA applicability is confirmed, PSPs frequently need to go back and formalize vendor oversight, assemble evidence, and operationalize incident response across already-live dependencies.
๐๐ก๐๐ญ ๐๐๐๐ ๐๐๐ช๐ฎ๐ข๐ซ๐๐ฌ ๐๐ก๐๐ง ๐๐จ๐ฎ ๐๐ฌ๐ ๐๐ก๐ข๐ซ๐ ๐๐๐ซ๐ญ๐ข๐๐ฌ
If a PSP receives third-party services related to a payment function, the PSP’s written risk management and incident response framework must include an approach to third-party assessment, monitoring, notifications, responsibility allocation, and recordkeeping.
In practical terms, this usually means the framework clearly describes:
- how third parties are assessed
- what is monitored and how often
- how incidents and disruptions are communicated
- how responsibilities are allocated between PSP and vendor
- how evidence is retained so it can be produced during review
AMLI Analysis: The requirement is to operate a vendor oversight system that produces evidence on demand.
๐๐ก๐๐ญ ๐๐จ๐ฎ๐ง๐ญ๐ฌ ๐๐ฌ ๐ “๐๐๐ซ๐ฏ๐ข๐๐ ๐๐๐ฅ๐๐ญ๐๐ ๐ญ๐จ ๐ ๐๐๐ฒ๐ฆ๐๐ง๐ญ ๐ ๐ฎ๐ง๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง” (๐ข๐ง ๐๐ฅ๐๐ข๐ง ๐๐ง๐ ๐ฅ๐ข๐ฌ๐ก)?
A practical way to interpret “service related to a payment function” is operational dependence.
If the vendor’s service affects any of the following, it usually belongs inside the PSP’s vendor oversight scope:
- availability of systems used for retail payment activities
- integrity of transaction state, records, or reconciliation
- confidentiality, integrity, or availability of PSP data and information
- security of connections into the PSP environment
- the PSP’s ability to detect, respond to, and recover from incidents
๐๐ก๐๐ญ ๐๐ก๐ข๐ซ๐-๐๐๐ซ๐ญ๐ฒ ๐๐ซ๐จ๐ฏ๐ข๐๐๐ซ๐ฌ ๐๐๐ญ๐ฎ๐๐ฅ๐ฅ๐ฒ ๐๐จ: ๐๐๐ง๐๐จ๐ซ ๐๐จ๐ฅ๐๐ฌ ๐๐๐ฉ๐ฉ๐๐ ๐ญ๐จ ๐๐๐๐ ๐๐ฏ๐๐ซ๐ฌ๐ข๐ ๐ก๐ญ
Connecting vendor governance to the vendor's actual role in the payment stack simplifies the process.
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๐๐ฅ๐จ๐ฎ๐, ๐๐จ๐ฌ๐ญ๐ข๐ง๐ , ๐๐ง๐ ๐๐ง๐๐ซ๐๐ฌ๐ญ๐ซ๐ฎ๐๐ญ๐ฎ๐ซ๐
What they support: system availability, data storage, logging, and access control.
What oversight must cover: data protection, connection security, monitoring, breach/disruption notifications, and change consultation.
Evidence examples: access reviews, logging coverage statements, outage history, incident postmortems, and change notices.
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๐๐๐ฒ๐ฆ๐๐ง๐ญ ๐๐ซ๐จ๐๐๐ฌ๐ฌ๐จ๐ซ๐ฌ, ๐๐๐ข๐ฅ ๐๐ง๐ญ๐๐ ๐ซ๐๐ญ๐จ๐ซ๐ฌ, ๐๐ง๐ ๐๐๐๐ก๐ง๐ข๐๐๐ฅ ๐๐๐ซ๐ฏ๐ข๐๐ ๐๐ซ๐จ๐ฏ๐ข๐๐๐ซ๐ฌ
What they support: transaction routing, message handling, and settlement dependencies.
What oversight must cover: performance monitoring, disruption notifications, and change consultation before impactful changes.
Evidence examples: uptime metrics, escalation paths, and change rollback procedures.
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๐ ๐ซ๐๐ฎ๐, ๐๐๐๐ง๐ญ๐ข๐ญ๐ฒ, ๐๐ง๐ ๐๐๐๐ฎ๐ซ๐ข๐ญ๐ฒ ๐๐จ๐จ๐ฅ๐ข๐ง๐
What they support: anomaly detection, account takeover controls, and identity proofing signals.
What oversight must cover: monitoring, incident/breach notifications, and responsibility allocation for escalation and decisioning.
Evidence examples: alert handling procedures, threshold governance, and escalation records.
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๐๐๐๐ ๐๐ซ, ๐๐๐๐จ๐ง๐๐ข๐ฅ๐ข๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง, ๐๐ง๐ ๐๐๐ฉ๐จ๐ซ๐ญ๐ข๐ง๐ ๐๐ฒ๐ฌ๐ญ๐๐ฆ๐ฌ
What they support: transaction integrity, reconciliation, exception handling, and audit trails.
What oversight must cover: data integrity controls, monitoring, incident coordination, and safeguarding impacts where end-user funds are held.
Evidence examples: reconciliation logs, exception queue governance, sign-offs, and audit trails.
AMLI Analysis: Vendor oversight is strongest when each critical control has a named owner on the PSP side. That ownership ensures controls are actually run, reviewed, and evidenced, rather than assumed to be handled by the vendor.
๐๐ก๐๐ญ ๐๐๐๐ ๐๐๐ง๐๐จ๐ซ ๐๐ฏ๐๐ซ๐ฌ๐ข๐ ๐ก๐ญ ๐๐๐๐ง๐ฌ ๐ข๐ง ๐๐ซ๐๐๐ญ๐ข๐๐
Many PSPs treat vendor oversight as procurement work. Supervisory review treats it as control effectiveness.
In operational terms, being vendor-ready means you can show:
- which vendors support which payment functions, and which are critical
- what risks each vendor introduces to availability, security, and incident response
- what controls exist to manage those risks
- how incidents and changes are handled end-to-end, including coordination with the vendor
- what proof exists that oversight runs continuously, not only on paper
AMLI Analysis: Supervisory questions tend to be direct. Who owns this dependency? How do you know it is working? What happens when it fails?
๐๐๐ฏ๐ข๐๐ฐ-๐๐๐๐๐ฒ ๐๐ฏ๐ข๐๐๐ง๐๐
The goal is to maintain a coherent evidence set that ties vendor oversight to how the PSP actually operates. It should be easy to update and retrieve, and it should be consistent across vendor types.
๐๐ฑ๐๐ฆ๐ฉ๐ฅ๐ ๐: ๐๐ฅ๐จ๐ฎ๐ ๐๐ซ๐จ๐ฏ๐ข๐๐๐ซ (infrastructure-critical)
A typical evidence set includes:
- vendor inventory entry mapped to payment functions and criticality
- annual assessment record with date, scope, findings, and remediation tracking
- data protection evidence (access reviews, encryption posture summary, logging coverage summary)
- connection security evidence (authentication approach, network boundary controls)
- change control evidence (change notices, consultation triggers, approval triggers)
- incident coordination evidence (incident comms log or tabletop output for a vendor outage scenario)
๐๐ฑ๐๐ฆ๐ฉ๐ฅ๐ ๐: ๐๐๐ฒ๐ฆ๐๐ง๐ญ ๐๐ซ๐จ๐๐๐ฌ๐ฌ๐จ๐ซ ๐จ๐ซ ๐๐๐ข๐ฅ ๐๐ง๐ญ๐๐ ๐ซ๐๐ญ๐จ๐ซ (transaction-path critical)
A typical evidence set includes:
- vendor inventory entry mapped to specific flows and payment functions
- assessment record plus a reassessment trigger when contract scope materially changes
- performance monitoring evidence (uptime reporting, disruption notifications, escalation channels)
- change control evidence (release notes, integration change notices, rollback expectations)
- incident response evidence (incident declaration process, shared comms plan, escalation timeline)
- transaction integrity evidence (reconciliation linkages, exception ownership, post-incident integrity checks)
AMLI Analysis: Most PSPs can gather these items. The differentiator is whether they are maintained in a consistent format, tied to named owners, and aligned to actual operations.
๐๐ฎ๐ฉ๐๐ซ๐ฏ๐ข๐ฌ๐จ๐ซ๐ฒ ๐๐๐ฏ๐ข๐๐ฐ: ๐ ๐๐ก๐จ๐ซ๐ญ ๐๐ฎ๐๐ฌ๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง ๐๐๐ญ ๐๐๐๐ฌ ๐๐ก๐จ๐ฎ๐ฅ๐ ๐๐ ๐๐๐๐๐ฒ ๐ญ๐จ ๐๐ง๐ฌ๐ฐ๐๐ซ
Use this as a self-check during readiness work:
- Show your vendor inventory and identify which vendors are critical, along with a rationale.
- Provide your most recent assessment record for a critical vendor, including findings and remediation.
- Show an example of a vendor change notification and how you evaluated the impact.
- Show an incident record where a vendor dependency was involved, including escalation and communications.
- Show how evidence is stored and how quickly it can be produced.
AMLI Analysis: These questions expose where policies and contracts do not match day-to-day workflows.
๐๐จ๐ฐ ๐ญ๐จ ๐๐๐๐ข๐ง๐ “๐๐ซ๐ข๐ญ๐ข๐๐๐ฅ ๐๐๐ง๐๐จ๐ซ๐ฌ” ๐ข๐ง ๐๐ฉ๐๐ซ๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง๐๐ฅ ๐๐๐ซ๐ฆ๐ฌ
A repeatable method PSPs use to identify critical vendors includes:
- end-user impact if the vendor fails (availability, payment completion, access to funds)
- replaceability (time and feasibility to switch, or to degrade safely)
- data sensitivity and access level
- whether the vendor touches payment execution or transaction state
- concentration risk (single point of failure, dependency chaining)
- change frequency and operational complexity (more change increases oversight demand)
AMLI Analysis: “Critical vendor” should be defensible in writing. PSPs should be able to explain why a vendor is or is not critical using consistent criteria.
๐๐๐๐๐ ๐ฎ๐๐ซ๐๐ข๐ง๐ ๐๐ง๐-๐๐ฌ๐๐ซ ๐ ๐ฎ๐ง๐๐ฌ: ๐๐ก๐๐ซ๐ ๐๐๐ง๐๐จ๐ซ๐ฌ ๐๐๐ฅ๐ฉ, ๐๐ง๐ ๐๐ก๐๐ซ๐ ๐๐ก๐๐ฒ ๐๐๐ง๐ง๐จ๐ญ
Safeguarding expectations apply to PSPs that have obligations to safeguard end-user funds and, in particular, to PSPs that perform the payment function of holding funds on behalf of an end user until withdrawal or transfer.
Where third parties help:
- safeguarding account structures through financial institution partners
- ledgering and reconciliation tooling
- monitoring and exception management systems
Where third parties cannot replace PSP accountability:
- the PSP must be able to evidence how safeguarding is implemented, monitored, and governed, including how discrepancies are detected, escalated, and resolved
๐ ๐๐ข๐ง๐ข ๐๐ฉ๐๐ซ๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง๐๐ฅ ๐๐ฅ๐๐ฒ๐๐จ๐จ๐ค ๐๐จ๐ซ ๐๐๐๐๐ ๐ฎ๐๐ซ๐๐ข๐ง๐ (week-to-week)
- reconciliation cadence: daily or next-business-day with defined cut-off times
- exception ownership: named owner for breaks, with escalation thresholds and deadlines
- approval and sign-off: defined reviewer, with records retained
- break resolution discipline: documented steps, investigation notes, closure evidence
- evidence retention: consistent storage of logs, exceptions, approvals, remediation actions
AMLI Analysis: Safeguarding failures are usually process failures. Reconciliation delays, unresolved exceptions, and unclear approvals become visible quickly when volumes grow.
๐๐ก๐๐ญ ๐๐๐ฉ๐๐ซ๐ฐ๐จ๐ซ๐ค ๐๐จ ๐๐ ๐๐๐๐ ๐๐จ๐ซ ๐๐๐๐ ๐๐๐ง๐๐จ๐ซ ๐๐จ๐ฆ๐ฉ๐ฅ๐ข๐๐ง๐๐?
Think in terms of an evidence set that maps cleanly to the RPAR.
Minimum set:
- vendor inventory mapped to payment functions and criticality
- assessment records with date, scope, findings, and remediation tracking
- responsibility allocation matrix (data ownership, integrity, confidentiality, availability)
- change management process and examples of vendor change notifications
- monitoring metrics and disruption records, including escalation evidence
- incident records showing coordination, reporting, and evidence retention
AMLI Analysis: The strongest signal is consistency. Contracts, operating procedures, and incident records should tell the same story.
๐๐ฆ๐ฉ๐ฅ๐ข๐๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง๐ฌ ๐๐ฌ ๐๐จ๐ฆ๐ฉ๐ฅ๐๐ฑ๐ข๐ญ๐ฒ ๐๐ซ๐จ๐ฐ๐ฌ: ๐๐๐ง๐๐จ๐ซ ๐๐ก๐๐ข๐ง๐ฌ, ๐ ๐จ๐ฎ๐ซ๐ญ๐ก ๐๐๐ซ๐ญ๐ข๐๐ฌ, ๐๐ง๐ ๐๐ฏ๐ข๐๐๐ง๐๐ ๐๐ซ๐ข๐๐ญ
As PSPs scale, vendor oversight becomes harder for three common reasons:
- vendors change faster, and change control becomes a continuous requirement
- vendor chains grow, meaning critical services rely on subcontractors and embedded providers
- evidence drifts, meaning controls exist but operational proof and recordkeeping fall behind
AMLI Analysis: At scale, the oversight challenge is governance discipline. Processes need owners, triggers, and repeatable evidence outputs.
๐๐ซ๐๐๐ญ๐ข๐๐๐ฅ ๐๐ญ๐๐ฉ๐ฌ ๐ญ๐จ ๐๐ญ๐ซ๐๐ง๐ ๐ญ๐ก๐๐ง ๐๐ก๐ข๐ซ๐-๐๐๐ซ๐ญ๐ฒ ๐๐ฏ๐๐ซ๐ฌ๐ข๐ ๐ก๐ญ ๐๐ง๐๐๐ซ ๐๐๐๐
A practical baseline approach:
- map vendors to payment functions and define criticality using a documented rubric
- use an RPAR-aligned assessment template and retain dated records
- define change triggers so reassessment happens when scope or risk changes, not only on a calendar
- integrate vendors into incident response playbooks, escalation paths, and recordkeeping
- test at least one vendor-driven incident scenario per year and retain the result as evidence
๐ ๐ซ๐๐ช๐ฎ๐๐ง๐ญ๐ฅ๐ฒ ๐๐ฌ๐ค๐๐ ๐๐ฎ๐๐ฌ๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง๐ฌ
Q: ๐๐ก๐๐ง ๐ข๐ฌ ๐ญ๐ก๐ ๐๐ข๐ซ๐ฌ๐ญ ๐๐ง๐ง๐ฎ๐๐ฅ ๐ซ๐๐ฉ๐จ๐ซ๐ญ ๐๐ฎ๐ ๐๐จ๐ซ ๐๐๐ญ๐๐ข๐ฅ ๐๐๐ฒ๐ฆ๐๐ง๐ญ๐ฌ ๐๐ฎ๐ฉ๐๐ซ๐ฏ๐ข๐ฌ๐ข๐จ๐ง?
A: The Bank of Canada’s RPAA FAQ states the first annual report is due by March 31, 2026, as prescribed in the regulations.
Q: ๐๐ฌ ๐ ๐ฏ๐๐ง๐๐จ๐ซ ๐ช๐ฎ๐๐ฌ๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง๐ง๐๐ข๐ซ๐ ๐๐ง๐จ๐ฎ๐ ๐ก?
A: Usually not. The RPAR expects assessment records with findings and responsibility allocation. Operational risk guidance also emphasizes effective outcomes and testing. A questionnaire can support an assessment but rarely proves operational effectiveness on its own.
Q: ๐๐จ ๐ซ๐๐ ๐ฎ๐ฅ๐๐ญ๐จ๐ซ๐ฌ ๐ซ๐๐ช๐ฎ๐ข๐ซ๐ ๐๐๐ ๐ ๐จ๐ซ ๐๐๐ ๐๐๐๐๐?
A: The supervisory focus is effectiveness and evidence. Assurance reports can support control but do not replace PSP oversight, monitoring, and responsibility allocation.
Q: ๐๐จ๐๐ฌ ๐๐๐๐ ๐๐ฉ๐ฉ๐ฅ๐ฒ ๐ญ๐จ ๐๐ข๐ง๐ญ๐๐๐ก๐ฌ ๐ญ๐ก๐๐ญ ๐๐จ ๐ง๐จ๐ญ ๐ก๐จ๐ฅ๐ ๐๐ง๐-๐ฎ๐ฌ๐๐ซ ๐๐ฎ๐ง๐๐ฌ?
A: It can. Scope depends on whether the PSP performs retail payment activities in scope. Safeguarding obligations are specifically relevant when the PSP performs the payment function of holding funds on behalf of an end user.
Q: ๐๐จ ๐ฌ๐ฎ๐๐๐จ๐ง๐ญ๐ซ๐๐๐ญ๐จ๐ซ๐ฌ ๐๐ง๐ fourth parties matter?
A: Yes, in practice. If a critical vendor relies on subcontractors that affect security, availability, or transaction integrity, the PSP should be prepared to evidence how that dependency is understood and managed through contracting, monitoring, and incident coordination.
๐๐๐ญ๐ญ๐ข๐ง๐ ๐๐ฎ๐ฉ๐ฉ๐จ๐ซ๐ญ
AML Incubator supports PSPs through:
- RPAA Registration and Implementation Support (risk management framework, incident response, safeguarding, and RPAR-aligned third-party oversight)
- Fractional CRO Support (ongoing governance ownership, oversight cadence, evidence maintenance, and readiness for supervisory review)
- Vendor Oversight and Evidence Set Build-Out (vendor inventory mapping, criticality rubric, assessment templates, change triggers, incident coordination, and review-ready documentation)
AMLI can review your vendor inventory, map it to RPAR expectations, and structure a practical evidence set that is maintainable in daily operations. This is often where PSPs gain speed, because oversight becomes standardized rather than rebuilt for each review.




